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Ugly, Dirty and Bad1: Working Class
Aesthetics Reconsidered
Alessandra Asteriti
Abstract, This article, taking at its starting point the work of Pier Paolo
Pasolini, tackles the aesthetic of the working class as an objet d’art: how is the
aesthetic sense of those who do not belong to the working class, but claim a
political interest in its destiny, engaged by the outward appearance of the
working class? And, more speciﬁcally, has there been a shift from a sense of
aesthetic appreciation to what this author perceives as revulsion towards
Western working classes? Has our aesthetic gaze wandered off, in search of
more distant objects? It is not our goal to answer these questions by means
of a quantitative or qualitative sociological analysis, and to this extent, the
answers have to be taken as given. The article argues that there is a displace-
ment of our gaze towards the working classes in the developing world, result-
ing in yet another form of consumption (the campaigns for fair trade would
not be so successful without the picture-perfect  and picture-perfect
because so completely desolate and objectively poor  sweatshops and
small children in the ﬁelds). This displacement is not at all innocent. The arti-
cle will propose that there are legal consequences by using, and subverting,
Luhmann’s remark on legal taste; political consequences, where displacement
means invisibility and lack of voice; and social consequences, mirroring Paso-
lini’s horror at the cultural genocide, and now looking at the desolate spaces
it has left behind.
Keywords, Legal theory,
aesthetics, Pier Paolo Pasolini
INTRODUCTION
I miss the real, poor people who fought to get rid of the master, with-
out wanting to become that master. Because they were excluded
from everything, nobody had colonised them.2
Pier Paolo Pasolini, Italian poet, film-maker, writer, and intellectual, wrote exten-
sively about the influence of capitalism on the underclass, the embourgeoisement of
the working class, and the cultural genocide of the traditional Italian peasant cul-
ture.3 Taking inspiration from his writings, this article focuses on the aesthetic
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aspects of what he saw as the co-option of the sub-proletariat and the working class to
bourgeois values, through consumerism and the developments of late capitalism.
It is important to state as a way of introduction what this article will not do: it is
not this author’s intention to engage with the issue of the supposed lack of an aes-
thetic sensibility in the working class, which is central to the topic of taste, and
bourgeois taste in particular, in Pierre Bourdieu’s masterful study.4 Equally, the
article does not wish to discuss the related issue of cultural production in the con-
text of agency, that is, the capacity of the working class of an independent cultural
production, central to the writings of Gy€orgy Lukacs.5 This lack of engagement
with agency does not intend to do away with the intensely political approach Paso-
lini had towards the role of the sub-proletariat in the first instance and the other in
general, about which more will be said in the concluding section.
The article intends to focus on the aesthetic of the working class as an objet
d’art: how is the aesthetic sense of those who do not belong to the working class, but
claim a political interest in its destiny, engaged by the outward appearance of the
working class? And, more specifically, has there been a shift from a sense of aes-
thetic appreciation6 to what this author perceives as revulsion towards Western
working classes? Has our aesthetic gaze wandered off, in search of more distant
objects? It is not our goal to answer these questions by means of a quantitative or
qualitative sociological analysis, and to this extent, the answers have to be taken as
given. The article argues that there is a displacement of our gaze towards the work-
ing classes in the developing world, resulting in yet another form of consumption
(the campaigns for fair trade would not be so successful without the picture-perfect 
and picture-perfect because so completely desolate and objectively poor  sweatshops
and small children in the fields). This displacement is not at all innocent.7 The article
will propose that there are legal consequences  by using, and subverting,
Luhmann’s remark on legal taste; political consequences, where displacement means
invisibility and lack of voice; and social consequences, mirroring Pasolini’s horror at
the cultural genocide, and now looking at the desolate spaces it has left behind.
PASOLINI’S WORLD
Death is not being unable to communicate, but not being understood
anymore.8
Pasolini’s political thought was influenced by the intellectual production of the
Frankfurt School;9 what makes his late writing interesting, and worth revisiting
almost 40 years after his death,10 is his role as a caring and engaged witness of the
accelerated changes brought about by late capitalism in Italy, a country that had
preserved pre-modern structures and cultures until the early 1960s. His engage-
ment with the underclass, his love for them, remains a rare event in the hopelessly
elitist Italian cultural landscape, and contributed to his sense of isolation even
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within the Left.11 Pasolini’s critique of the consequences of consumerism on the Ital-
ian under- and working class is developed through the prism of aesthetics. In his
Lutheran Letters,12 he defended his aesthetic choice in the following terms:
My aestheticism is indivisible from my culture. Why deprive my cul-
ture of one of its elements even if it is spurious and perhaps even
superfluous? It completes a whole. I have no scruples about saying so,
because in these last few years I have become convinced that poverty
and backwardness are not by any means the worst ill. [. . .] The point
is this: my culture (with its aestheticism) makes me adopt a critical
attitude towards modern ‘things’ understood as linguistic signs.
In his poem on the students’ battle against the police at the Valle Giulia School
of Architecture in Rome, Pasolini criticized the students for attacking the police-
men, who belonged to the lower working class;13 in the heated debate that followed
the publication of the poem, Pasolini said:
I do not care if my poem is misunderstood [. . .] in my poem, I say:
you students are spoiled brats, and I hate you as I hate your fathers.
Why do I say this? Until my generation, young working class people
considered the bourgeoisie as an object, a separate world. We could
observe the bourgeoisie objectively with the outlook of the one who
is different: worker or peasant. For young people today, it is very
difficult to look at the bourgeoisie as a different class. Why? Because
the bourgeoisie is winning by co-opting workers and peasants. In
short, through neo-capitalism, the bourgeoisie is becoming the
whole society, coinciding with the history of the world.
This was the political background of his aesthetic judgment. Pasolini’s criticism of
the students playing the revolution game, pretending to be working class,
mirrored his criticism of working class young people pretending to be bourgeois
students, adopting the tastes and fashions and pretentions of the bourgeoisie. But the
two phenomena are not comparable: students are leaving behind the privileged posi-
tion to which they will return, working class youth are temporarily escaping their
own situation of disadvantage to which they will be inevitably pushed back, because
the terrain on which tastes and choices are made will shift under their feet.
Pasolini claimed his right to adopt aesthetics as the privileged viewpoint in his
critique. However, one cannot avoid the unpleasant coincidence between his judg-
ment and the revulsion that the dominant class normally feels towards proletarian
and underclass attitudes and behaviors. His disdain towards the students, borne
out of the recognition of their role as representatives of the ruling classes playing at
the revolution, is accompanied by his criticism of the working classes’ adoption of
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middle class tastes and fashions. It is this second argument that opens itself up to
criticism: is it right to chastise the working class for internalizing certain behaviors
and tastes, when they are not in control of this process, but victims of it?14 The criti-
cism that can be moved to Pasolini, of having an aesthetic appreciation of the work-
ing class only if it responds to certain criteria that have a sensual, and not only
political appeal, can be repeated, mutatis mutandis, for the modern disquiet that
we have in recognizing the working class as an object worthy of attention and aes-
thetic admiration. Pasolini used aestheticism instrumentally to uncover, through
an analysis of hair styles, fashions, sexual behavior and lifestyle choices, the new
power structures.15 We will see in the next section how Pasolini positioned himself
as one of the bourgeois witnesses, yet his aesthetic rejection remains problematic, if
the representatives of the culture he rejected suffered from the same conditions of
powerlessness and subjection as before, only with more disposable goods.16 How
fruitful is it to criticize the external manifestations of an objectively subaltern posi-
tion? Is it only aesthetics, or is it the disillusionment with a working class that did
not fulfill its role (did not come to ideological maturity, as Lukacs would put it) and
was co-opted by bourgeois values?
THE CULTURAL GENOCIDE
The light / of the future never ceases to wound us / for a moment.17
The previous section closed with an attempt to establish a link between the disquiet
at Pasolini’s dispassionate criticism expressed in aesthetic terms and our own avert-
ing the gaze from the modern working classes. Pasolini’s saving grace rested in the
sincerity of his cry of pain when confronted with what he defined as a cultural geno-
cide;18 in his Lutheran Letters, in reference to his movie Accattone  which he had
made in the early 1960s, before the genocide, or so he argued  he said:
In New York, Paris, London [. . .] unity, acculturation, centraliza-
tion, took place in a very different way. Marx was a witness to their
genocides more than a century ago. That such genocides are taking
place today in Italy substantially changes their historical nature.
Accattone and his friends went silently towards deportation and the
final solution, perhaps even laughing at their warders. But what
about us, the bourgeois witnesses?19
Pasolini’s position with respect to the embourgeoisement of the working class is
understandable, insofar as the working class had been co-opted, whatever value one
attributes to its cultural production, and consumerism had created a new individual.
Pasolini’s position on the existence of an independent proletarian culture opens itself
to charges of false-authenticity and populism or inverted ethnocentrism, as Bourdieu
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put it.20 However, his closeness to the young Roman underclass (sottoproletariato),
not completely unrelated to a homosexuality lived at the margins of society,21 pro-
vided him with insights on how the underclass viewed itself. In his words:
The culture of the lower classes (almost) no longer exists; there
exists only an economy of the lower classes [. . .] the atrocious
unhappiness or criminal aggressiveness of the proletarian and sub-
proletarian youth derives precisely from the mismatch between cul-
ture and economic conditions  from the impossibility of attaining
(except by imitating them) [emphasis added] middle-class cultural
models because of the persistent poverty which is masked by an illu-
sory improvement in the standard of living.22
The destruction of working class culture, the cultural genocide, resulted in a
lack of dialectic between independent cultural forms, which in turn allowed the
dominant class to colonize the imagination of the dominated class and to impose a
model. But that model was a fake one, and by adopting it the dominated class made
itself instantly recognizable as dominated, because incapable of attaining the real
article. Adorno’s writings on style and the role of the cultural industry provide an
illuminating parallel:
Having ceased to be anything but style, it [the culture industry]
reveals [style]’s secret: obedience to social hierarchy. Today aes-
thetic barbarity completes what has threatened the creations of the
spirit since they were gathered together as culture and neutralized.
To speak of culture was always contrary to culture. Culture as a
common denominator already contains in embryo that schematiza-
tion and process of cataloguing and classification which bring cul-
ture within the sphere of administration. And it is precisely the
industrialized, the consequent subsumption which entirely accords
with this notion of culture.23
This lack of tension, which reflects a cultural void, can be read into the lack of
class tension/struggle, and again is apparent in the aesthetics of the class, as inter-
preted through its behavioral patterns and gestures. If the worker had in his hands
the instruments of work, those could also be the instruments of revolution and, as
Pasolini wrote in his last, unfinished novel Petrolio:
it is the whole of reality that  while being derided  is reaccepted.
Reality cannot be divided into a conformist society, following the
evolution of capitalism, and those who oppose it, through class
struggle: reality contains and integrates both parts, because reality
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is not Manichaean, it does not recognize interruption. Derision
towards reality manages to reconcile integration, which is necessary
for its ordering, and the most radical and revolutionary critique.
What it reminds us of is the gesture of the worker, which is together
an act organic to the production process, to which he orderly contrib-
utes, and a gesture pregnant with revolutionary menace: the ambiva-
lence of this gesture contains the whole of reality. A bourgeois will
never be capable of such gesture. But the bourgeois can perceive
social reality as ‘nothingness’ and therefore identify life with the
derision of reality. This derision is the equivalent of the worker’s ges-
ture: it contains integration, while depriving it of any meaning.24
Is it a consequence of late capitalism and the loss of power and influence of the
working classes that this ambivalence has been lost, and with it the revolutionary
power it contained? Instead, to quote Bourdieu, the working class is caught up in an
integrative and reproductive struggle25 in which the stakes are always too high and
structurally unattainable: since it will never be possible to afford the aesthetics of
the bourgeoisie, to own it, the end result is an inevitable condition of aesthetic alien-
ation, which mirrors economic alienation. The interplay between the mimesis of the
working class, imitating the bourgeois models, and the judgmental aesthetic gaze
with which its attempts are observed masks the structural power struggles (or lack
thereof). Pasolini’s analysis is right in this respect, the working class has been co-
opted, consumerism has created a new individual; Bourdieu’s surveys seem to
reflect a reality that was already being dissolved, with the poor restraining from
buying and consuming what they could not afford in the first place (Bourdieu
remarks several times about the amor fati of the dominated); Pasolini already saw
beyond that, the inane desire of acquisition that has come to define our times,26 and
where restraint, paradoxically, becomes another form of conspicuous consumption
(where, to make an obvious example, being thin is a sign of affluence and being
overweight a sign of poverty).
Whatever value one attributes to cultural production, the gap remains and it is a
structural economic gap that takes an aesthetic form, that is visible aesthetically
and not economically anymore, or better, that need not be defined economically
because it is aesthetically visible. Pasolini reminds us that “when the exploiters
(by means of the exploited) produce goods, in reality they produce human beings
(social relations)” and that these social relations, as created by consumerism, “are
not subject to modification.”27 The fixity of this relationship results in the lack of
alterity lamented by Pasolini, to which we now turn.
ALTERITY AND DIALECTICS
Between these two worlds, the truce, in which we are/not.28
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In his Lutheran Letters, Pasolini commented on the lack of alterity that is a conse-
quence of the disappearance of the working class as a cultural and political subject.
In describing the city of Bologna, which was at the time under a communist admin-
istration, Pasolini said:
What an Italian city has become, for good or ill, is here accepted,
assimilated, and codified. In being both a developed and communist
city, [Bologna] is not only a city where there is no alternative, but
also a city where there is no alterity.29
The new exemplar of consumer/human being is forced to live: “in a state of what one
might call weightlessness: a state which allows them to accord to consumption and
the satisfaction of its hedonistic demands the privilege of being the only
possible existential act.”30 The similarities with Zizek’s criticism of “frictionless
capitalism” are obvious;31 it is undoubtedly the lack of alterity, and therefore the
lack of dialectics, that has to be picked up as the problematic element, from
the point of view of class definition and struggle. Pasolini referred to this in the
following terms:
the possibility of alterity does not exist only in class-consciousness
and in revolutionary Marxist struggle. It also exists of its own accord
in capitalist entropy. There it enjoys its concrete expression, its fac-
tual nature. What is, and that “other” which is contained in what is,
are two cultural data. Between two such data there exists a relation-
ship based on prevarication [. . .] to transform their relationship into
a dialectical relationship is the function [. . .] of Marxism: a dialectical
relationship between the culture of class that rules and the class
that is ruled. Such a dialectical relationship would therefore no lon-
ger be possible where the culture of the class that is ruled had disap-
peared, been eliminated [. . .] so one must fight for the conservation of
all forms of culture, whether alternate or subaltern [. . .].32
With this, we have travelled quite beyond reflections on aesthetics and cul-
tural production, and close to issues of political agency of the working class and
the possibility of a dialectical synthesis. Pasolini himself, as we shall see, was
quite skeptical about the feasibility of a dialectical overcoming of this opposition,
at least in the post-genocide era he argued we had entered (in the “After-History”
he mentioned in the poem quoted in the penultimate section). In this regard, the
displacement of his aesthetic gaze to the Third World can be read as an attempt
to salvage the possibility of resistance against capitalist colonization. In the next
section, we will refocus our attention on aesthetics as it was framed in the intro-
duction, opening with a small disclaimer.
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PURE GAZE AND FUNCTIONAL GAZE: REFLEXIVE AESTHETICS
Stupendous and miserable city [. . .].33
It might seem a minor point, in this conjuncture, to argue for the need for an aesthetics
of the working class as the problematic absence in modern day discussions on class. In
order to justify its relevance, it is necessary to take a step back, or better, sideways, to
consider how aesthetics can help in unfolding, or overcoming, the fissure between form
and function that, we argued, could be at the basis of the current aesthetic revulsion
towards the Western working classes. In his book on taste, Bourdieu outlined the dis-
tinction between the pure gaze of the bourgeoisie and the functional gaze of the work-
ing class; what distinguished the two was the primacy of form over function for the
first and of function over form for the second; this categorization was always to be
taken in relation of a third, the object as artistic object. As Bourdieu noted:
It must never be forgotten that the working class “aesthetic” is a domi-
nated “aesthetic,” which is constantly obliged to define itself in terms
of the dominant aesthetics. The members of the working class, who
can neither ignore high-art aesthetic, which denounces their own
“aesthetic,” nor abandon their socially conditioned inclinations, but still
less proclaim them and legitimate them, often experience their rela-
tionship to the aesthetic norms in a twofold and contradictory way.34
Both aesthetics define themselves in opposition to each other, because each
assigns a different value to the two elements of the binary opposition form/function.
Where for the bourgeois aesthetic form prevails over function, and function acquires
aesthetic value only insofar as is read as form (therefore an everyday object can be
an object of art if it is seen formally, not functionally), for the working class aes-
thetic function determines artistic value, which substantiates itself in a form that
has to be the accepted form for artistic purposes (the objet d’art has to be formally
beautiful, and the working class representative typically will not recognize the for-
mal beauty of a functional object). Bourdieu’s observation that the pure gaze of the
bourgeois or intellectual recognizes artistic value in form rather than function can
be employed fruitfully in our own observation about the aesthetic value of the work-
ing class qua object. If we transfer this dichotomy (form/function) to our field of
inquiry, what can we say of the aesthetic appreciation of the working class as a
functional object seen in its formal qualities? Is the lamented lack of appreciation
due to a degradation of the form or a loss of function? Arguably the two are con-
nected, as was posited at the beginning of this article. If form is dependent on func-
tion, a loss of function carries a degradation of the form. Bourdieu claimed that the
working class aesthetic is “based on the affirmation of the continuity between art
and life, which implies the subordination of form to function,”35 against a Kantian
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aesthetics which is disinterested and therefore detached.36 Terry Eagleton noted
the social function of aesthetics in Kant in creating a community of shared feelings,
a sort of “intimate Gemeinshaft”;37 amongst other considerations, the ease of trans-
fer between this aesthetic community of feelings and a sense of shared morality is
not to be dismissed, if only formally. It is against this disinterested appreciation
that Marx juxtaposes his telic use of aesthetic judgment; Eagleton goes as far as to
claim that Marx adopts an anti-aesthetic aesthetics, in the sense of an aesthetic
that eschews all pretentions of disinterestedness and grounds aesthetic apprecia-
tion in the utility of the objects (so in their function).38
The dichotomy between form and function brings us back to agency. The aes-
thetic appreciation for the working class cannot easily be divorced from an almost
messianic faith in its redemptive historical role; its function in bringing about revo-
lutionary change cloaked it in formal beauty. Pasolini mercilessly pierces the veil
and exposes the hypocrisy of an intellectual class lost in an “aesthetic fog” that ulti-
mately divided the deserving from the undeserving poor on the basis of their ethics
of work as an agent for change. The main character in Accattone exemplifies this
disdain towards “work” that horrified the orthodox left.39 Pasolini’s reminder that,
in the name of the dialectic of struggle, we ought to preserve subaltern cultures
invites us not to avert the gaze from a working class that has disappointed our
expectations of its redemptive function and therefore “uglified itself.”40 How far this
is from that sense of beauty that emanated from the working classes before the
“cultural genocide.” There is a sense of wistful love in this poem by Sandro Penna41
that Pasolini would surely have recognized:
Here are the workers on the green grass,
Eating their lunch: aren’t they beautiful?
Cars rush around them,
People go by, carrying newspapers.
But aren’t the workers beautiful?42
And in turn, one is reminded of Marx’s aesthetic appreciation of the French working
men, in the following passage:
When communists workmen gather together, their immediate aim
is instruction, propaganda, etc. But at the same time they acquire a
new need  a need for society  and what appears as a means has
become an end. This practical development can be most strikingly
observed in the gatherings of French socialist workers. Smoking,
eating and drinking, etc., are no longer means of creating links
199
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between people. Company, association, conversation, which in its
turn has society as its goal, is enough for them. The brotherhood of
man is not a hollow phrase, it is a reality, and the nobility of man
shines forth upon us from their work-worn figures.43
But, truth to be told, Pasolini’s aesthetic journey from the Roman underclass to
the Indian poor seems to exemplify the same aesthetic revulsion that was mentioned
at the beginning; in order to rescue Pasolini’s position from this criticism we have to
consider its political meaning.44 But before that, a brief digression into the role of aes-
thetics in law is in order, as a reminder of the uphill battle against aesthetic inertia.
LEGAL TASTE AND AESTHETIC JUDGMENT
in the waste of the world, a new/world is born: new laws are born/
where there is no law left.45
The relationship between law and aesthetics has been explored before and would
take us beyond the scope of this article.46 It is, frustratingly, both incredibly narrow
and focused in scope, and vague and fluctuating in meaning, so that any attempt to
employ this relationship fruitfully runs the risk of dissolving into generalities or col-
lapsing into self-referentiality. This has partially to do with what one intends for
aesthetics. For our purpose, it is neither a generic reference to the perception of the
world through the senses (as opposed to intellectual or moral cognition), nor an
instrument for evaluating law as an artifact in its formal aspects. Instead, law itself
is seen here to provide a sense of measure, as mediating between ourselves and the
world in a way that is particular and specific to it. To this effect, a crucial distinction
is necessary as to the terms of this relationship along functional lines, or, differently
put, what acts on what. Much has been said on law’s aesthetic quality, both as litera-
ture and as image.47 This is evident from the very first legislative artifacts produced,
which display both a sophisticated use of imagery and iconography and an aesthetic
use of the law as signifier of the ideal society.48 In this sense, law is the passive object
of aesthetic observation and the active producer of aesthetic markers that confer upon
it a certain image and linguistic identity. The aesthetics of authority, well recogniz-
able in our own representation of “the Law” (including in its performative function),
combines with the aesthetics of reason that legal language wishes to convey. Here
there is both overlap (architectural and artistic symmetry in our traditional represen-
tation of the law and linguistic symmetry in proportionality and balance as archetypi-
cal legal metaphors) and slippage (from aesthetics to reason, where the beautiful and
the just seep into each other).49 In this relationship, where aesthetics acts upon law,
aesthetics helps to naturalize law and therefore contributes to overcome the well-
known legal paradox of a self-sustaining system without foundation (where the classi-
cal foundations of many legal buildings obscure the foundationless structure of the
200
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law they house).50 And further, by this aestheticization of the law, a process of inter-
nalization is accomplished by which we “spontaneously” turn towards what is moral
and lawful in the pursuit of what is agreeable and good.51
Not all are willing participants in this process of internalization, through aes-
thetics, of morality and law. At the borders, as reminders, as excess, as excluded,
there remains a whole lot of humanity. And law can also use aesthetics, and
more specifically, aesthetic judgment, when adjudicating upon their misdeeds.
We have already mentioned proportionality as a way in which the law adjudi-
cates and apportions rights and restrictions on rights. The very language of the
law employs a characteristic anti-aesthetic aesthetics of neutrality that is highly
discriminating. We as observers can assess the aesthetic, artistic, and ultimately
political value of such a stark choice of style before substance. But the law itself
employs aesthetic judgment when it observes its environment. This is more obvi-
ous where at stake there are matters where aesthetic judgment is intrinsically
part of the legal judgment  planning law,52 or obscenity law53  but more inter-
estingly, when this is not the case. In his Law as a Social System, Niklas
Luhmann only too briefly referred to legal taste in the context of human rights,
in the following terms:
It may appear cynical today, but if one considers Kant’s theory and
his critique of sound judgement in the context of his three critiques,
one could also appeal to the effectiveness of sound judgement in
relation to “legal taste,” in order to make it clear that this is neither
a merely cognitive issue nor one of the application of practical postu-
lates in the form of moral law.54
The implications of aesthetic discourse for the rights of the working class, and
their diminishing value (and we refer here to labor rights, including the right to
strike, for example) are here self-evident; Luhmann’s comment seems to point in
that direction, albeit indirectly and indeed in a positive way. If an educated legal
taste allows us to recognize the evidence of human rights violations (as Luhmann
put it: “In view of all sorts of horrific scenes, no further discussion is necessary”),
one could argue that conversely, an uneducated legal taste could blind us, and the
law, to human rights violations when these do not conform to certain aesthetic crite-
ria. It is essential to note the presence of this blind spot, this aesthetic inertia I
referred to earlier, as it is thanks to this that aesthetic judgment predetermines
and undermines legal judgment.
If the connection is made between legal taste and aesthetic judgment, then a
negative aesthetic judgment could prevent the recognition of violations of rights
that are already routinely dismissed as unnecessary, such as labor rights and eco-
nomic rights. There is an overlap here between the aesthetics of suffering and the
aesthetics of legal judgment; additionally, and at a higher level of generalization, it
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can be argued that aesthetics is the way in which the legal order looks at the world,
indeed the only way. As Eagleton noted:
That “lawfulness without law” which Kant will identify in the aes-
thetic is first of all a question of the social Lebenswelt, which seems
to work with all the rigorous encodement of a rational law but where
such law is never quite abstractable from the sensuously particular
conduct which instantiates it. The bourgeoisie has won certain his-
toric victories within the political state; but the problem with such
conflicts is that, in rendering the Law perceptible as a discourse,
they threaten to denaturalize it. Once the Law is objectified by polit-
ical struggle, it becomes itself an object of contestation. Legal, politi-
cal and economic transformations must therefore be translated into
new kinds of spontaneous social practice, which in a kind of creative
repression or amnesia can afford to forget the very laws they obey.
Structures of power must become structures of feeling and the name
for this mediation from property to propriety is the aesthetic.55
The crucial point to be noted here is in the reflexive character of the aesthetic
moment, whereby it is through aesthetic cognition56 that we apprehend the world
and its power structures, including its legal order (in hegemonic manner, in Grams-
cian terms), but equally, the legal order distinguishes and categorizes according to
aesthetic criteria.
And with this we come back to Pasolini, who had the distinction of being the
most prosecuted artist in Italy, with more than 30 trials to his name for obscenity
and contempt of religion. These trials, which involved testimony from some of the
most important Italian intellectuals of the time, can be seen both as a form of politi-
cal trial that uses aesthetic judgment (it is his worth as an artist that is put on trial
amongst other things) and as in itself a form of artistic performance by Pasolini; in
the trial for his movie La Ricotta, two of his poems were quoted by the defense coun-
sel to clarify his position with respect to the Catholic Church: so poetic language
becomes court evidence.
MIMESIS AND POLITICS
The problem of the destruction of the class that is governed, seen as
the elimination of a dialectical and therefore threatening alterity, is
a problem that concerns the majority.57
We have come to the point where the screen of aesthetic distancing is working
against any attempt of political action.58 Pasolini himself claimed his aesthetic
choice, as we have seen, and yet at the same time overcame its alienating risks by,
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in a Hegelian move, dialectically engaging with the object/subject he was observ-
ing.59 This being within the subject and outside of it he would have claimed as the
position of the true intellectual, if the possibility of political alterity was to remain
real. In his collection of essaysHeretical Empiricism, Pasolini wrote:
The most detestable and intolerable thing, even in the most inno-
cent of bourgeois, is the inability to acknowledge experiences of life
that are different from their own, which means conceiving all other
experiences as substantially analogous to their own. [. . .] These
bourgeois writers, no matter how virtuous and dignified, who can-
not recognize the extreme psychological difference of another
human being from their own, take the first step towards forms of
discrimination that are essentially racist; in this sense they are not
free, but they belong deterministically to their own class: fundamen-
tally, there is no difference between them and a head of the police or
an executioner in a concentration camp.60
Vighi noted the overlap between Pasolini’s total mimesis with the excluded and
Zizek’s comment on the political force contained in the act of “identifying universal-
ity with the point of exclusion.”61 Pasolini himself elaborated on the dangers of
eschewing this mimesis, again in his Lutheran Letters:
There are intellectuals, engaged intellectuals, who consider it their
own and other people’s duty to make known to lovable people, who
do not know it, that they have rights;62 to incite lovable people not
to renounce rights they know they possess; to compel everyone to
feel the historical impulse to fight for the rights of others; and
finally, to consider it to be incontrovertible and absolute, as between
exploiters and exploited, that the exploited are the unhappy ones.
[. . .] It is now time to mention that the rights I have been talking
about are “civil rights” [. . .] what does the extremist who teaches
others to have rights actually teach? He teaches that he who serves
has the same rights as the one who commands. What does the
extremist who teaches others to fight to obtain their own rights, in
fact teach? He teaches that one must exploit the same rights as the
bosses do. What does the extremist who teaches that those who
are exploited by the exploiters are unhappy, teach? He teaches that
one must lay claim to the same kind of happiness as the exploiters.
The result eventually reached in this way is therefore an identifica-
tion [emphasis added], that is to say, in the best of cases, democrati-
zation in the bourgeois sense. The tragedy of the extremists consists
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therefore in turning a struggle, which they define verbally as
MarxistLeninist and revolutionary, into a regressive civil war as
old as the bourgeoisie and essential to their very existence. The
attainment of one’s own rights merely promotes the person who
gains them to the rank of the bourgeoisie.63
Pasolini’s insistence on the universality of the excluded and the necessity of iden-
tification with their reality64 neatly mirrors his revulsion with this “upwardly mobile”
identification with the included that the intellectuals, even innocently, propose as the
solution.65 In this context, our criticism of aesthetic revulsion Pasolini felt for a co-
opted working class loses some of its force, because it fails to recognize a “tipping
point” that Pasolini identified. His identification with the excluded is significant to
the extent that he recognized the value of exclusion as the only place where political
action became possible; his averting the gaze, from the Roman sub-proletariat to the
transnational excluded was first and foremost a political act, in fact, the only political
act that defied co-option.66 The totalizing nature of Pasolini’s political choice of
refusal67 encompasses the physical, the sexual, the geographical, and the chronologi-
cal. His being outside is beautifully expressed in this poem:
I am a force of the past.
Tradition is my only love.
I come from the ruins, the churches,
the altarpieces, the abandoned
villages on the Apennines or the Prealps,
where the brothers lived.
I wander on the Tuscolana like a madman,
on the Appia like a stray dog.
Or I watch the twilights, the mornings
of Rome, of Ciociaria, of the world,
the first acts of this After-History,
of which I am the witness, by chronological privilege,
from the very end of some buried
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age. Only a monster can be born
from the womb of a dead woman.
And I, adult foetus, wander around,
more modern than any modern,
searching for brothers that are no more.68
One should not be too optimistic about Pasolini’s choice of exclusion as the only pos-
sible position, to the extent that it revealed a negative stance, an acknowledgment
of the (near) impossibility of revolution after the successful capitalist revolution.69
CONCLUSIONS
Will you ask of me, dead man, unadorned,/ that I abandon this hope-
less passion to be in the world?70
This article moved uneasily between acceptance and rejection of Pasolini’s aesthetic
judgment. The idea for this study was born out of the observation of the role of aes-
thetic judgment in modern discourses about class. Bourdieu defined one of the
strongest social sentiments, snobbery, in the following fashion: “Aesthetic intoler-
ance can be terribly violent. Aversion to different life-styles is perhaps one of the
strongest barriers between the classes; class endogamy is evidence of this.”71 And
Pasolini, in Petrolio, referred to the relationship between the protagonist Carlo72
and the working class Carmelo in the following terms:
The bourgeois Carlo  who was not by any means the most despica-
ble of bourgeois  [. . .], was therefore confronted with this problem:
was his inability to love Carmelo at the origin of his inability to love
his world, or was his inability to love the popular world preventing
him from loving Carmelo?73
At the basis of this aesthetic judgment there is necessarily a form of distanc-
ing.74 To bridge this aesthetic gap is a political gesture; one either overcomes it in
the name of politics or in the name of love. Pasolini’s “fundamentalist identification
with the constitutional other of the hegemonic bourgeois order”75 is both a declara-
tion of love and a political act, and consciously so. This “walk to the streets of the
poor, where you must be wretched and strong, brothers to the dogs” exemplifies
Pasolini’s attitude towards the underclass: it is his openness to it, his desire to learn
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it, internalize it, make it his, that allows that aesthetic gap bridging that we have
pursued in this work.
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tica 214 (1971).
60. Pier Paolo Pasolini, Empirismo eretico (Milan: Gar-
zanti, 1995), 8990 (the translation is given in
Vighi, “Pasolini and Exclusion,” 102).
61. And its Lacanian undertones; Vighi, “Pasolini and
Exclusion,” 1023.
62. Pasolini wrote this letter, with an eye, it seems, to
Wittgenstein, in apodictic mode, starting with the
ﬁrst postulate, that “The most lovable people are
those who do not know they have rights.”
63. Pasolini, Lutheran Letters, 120.
64. As the only reality that is not in the system yet. It is
crucial to stress that this is the opposite of sympa-
thy. One could imagine Pasolini argue that it is the
excluded who should have sympathy for the
included. In his poem Blue-eyed Alì, Pasolini preﬁg-
ures the arrival of immigrants from the African
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continent (“dressed in Asian rags and American
shirts,” an image now so familiar to us from the
news of yet another migrant boat arriving in Sicily
or Southern Spain, but an image he did not live to
see), and writes that they will come “to teach the
workers the joy of life  to teach the bourgeois the
joy of freedom [. . .]”; Pasolini, Tutte le poesie, 1287.
65. “At a time of a justiﬁed euphoria on the Left I fore-
see [. . .] the worst danger that awaits us intellec-
tuals [. . .] a new trahison des clercs, a new
acceptance, a new adhesion, a new surrender to
the fait accompli, a new regime even if it is only in
the form of a new culture and a new quality of life.
[. . .] The more fanatically an intellectual is con-
vinced of the value of his contribution to the attain-
ment of civil rights, the more he accepts the social-
democratic function which power imposes on him,
thus abrogating any real alternative [. . .]”; Pasolini,
Lutheran Letters, 126.
66. “Rather than playing the game of the endless, con-
tingent re-signiﬁcation of the liberal democratic
context, by then pervasively controlled by late-cap-
italist ideology, Pasolini assumed the impossible
and yet properly political risk of forcing a radical
break with that context, opening up the space for a
new historical conﬁguration”; Vighi, “Pasolini and
Exclusion,” 104.
67. As he put it in his script for a movie on Paul, “one
must protest by refusing to exist”; quoted in Blan-
ton, “Reappearance of Paul, ‘Sick’,” 71.
68. From the movie La ricotta (1963); in the movie,
Orson Welles reads the poem.
69. It is “the inﬁnite nature of desire” successfully har-
nessed by capitalism to bring about this impossibil-
ity; Walter Siti, “Pasolini’s Second Victory,” in Pier
Paolo Pasolini. Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Patrick
Rumble and Bart Testa (Toronto, ON: University of
Toronto Press, 1994), 58.
70. Pasolini, Tutte le poesie, 815.
71. Bourdieu, Distinction, 56.
72. The protagonist takes on different personiﬁcations
in the novel, including his transformation into a
woman; it is as a woman that Carlo has a sexual
relationship with Carmelo.
73. Pasolini, Petrolio, 317 (author’s translation).
74. The argument is here against moral sympathy and
the aesthetic of suffering, in other words, the rec-
ognition of the suffering of others. Even then, there
is a distancing movement, which is the disavowal of
any responsibility for that suffering. Dostoevsky lets
Ivan Karamazov, in the chapter aptly titled “Rebel-
lion,” clearly articulate the impossibility of compas-
sion; the monologue is worth quoting at length: “I
never could understand how it’s possible to love
one’s neighbours. In my opinion, it is precisely one’s
neighbours that one cannot possibly love. [. . .]
Let’s say that I, for example, am capable of pro-
found suffering, but another man will never be able
to know the degree of my suffering, because he is
another and not me, and besides, a man is rarely
willing to acknowledge someone else as a sufferer
(as if it were a kind of distinction). And why won’t
he acknowledge it, do you think? Because I, for
example, have a bad smell, or a foolish face, or once
stepped on his foot. Besides, there is suffering and
suffering: some benefactor of mine may still allow a
humiliating suffering, which humiliates me  hun-
ger, for example; but a slightly higher suffering 
for an idea, for example  no, that he will not allow,
save perhaps on rare occasions, because he will
look at me and suddenly see that my face is not at
all the kind of face that, he fancies, a man should
have who suffers, for example, for such and such an
idea. [. . .] It’s still possible to love one’s neighbour
abstractly, and even occasionally from a distance,
but hardly ever up close. If it were all as it is on
stage, in a ballet, where beggars, when they appear,
come in silken rags and tattered lace and ask for
alms dancing gracefully, well, then it would still be
possible to admire them. To admire, but still not
love”; Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov,
trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky
(New York, NY: Random House, 1991), 2367.
75. Vighi, “Pasolini and Exclusion,” 102.
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